ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate sales effort decisions for a crowdfunding market. We formulate three mathematical models for the constructed sales effort scenarios, respectively. After comparing the optimal solutions under the three scenarios, we determine the optimal sales effort strategies. We find that: 1) The project creator and the platform have stronger motivations to offer sales efforts to boost crowdfunding success when the funding goal of the project is low; 2) Compared with the platform manager, the project creator prefers more to offer sales efforts; 3) If the platform has sufficient capital, both the project creator and the platform should offer sales efforts; if not, it is better than the project creator separately offers sales efforts; 4) Both the platform and project creator prefer the sales efforts with positive interdependency; 5) More potential buyers which attracted by the platform's sales efforts will encourage the project creator to raise product price. However, the project creator will be forced to lower the product price due to its own sales efforts. Although it is universally accepted that the key to the successful launch of new products is to expand the market size, our managerial implication is that compared to the market size expansion, it is better for the entrepreneur of new products in crowdfunding environments to enhance the buyer evaluation of the product value, for example, by improving the description of product information.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, crowdfunding has become a popular method for enterprises to seek external financing [1] . There are tremendous growing amounts of funding raised by crowdfunding [2] . For example, Kickstarter, which was launched on April 28, 2009 , is one of the leading crowdfunding sites. As of 2018, 16 million people have backed crowdfunding projects, $4.1 billion has been pledged, and 156958 crowdfunding projects have been successfully funded in Kickstarter. At present, crowdfunding can take different forms, such as equity-based model, donation-based scheme and reward-based model [3] , [4] . We focus on reward-based crowdfunding in this paper due to it is the most innovative form of the crowdfunding market [5] . A reward-based crowdfunding consists of three parties, i.e., a creator who is the initiator of a crowdfunding project, funders or buyers
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Bijoy chand Chand Chatterjee. who back the crowdfunding project, and an open call on the Internet that can be a crowdfunding platform [6] . Specifically, entrepreneurs collect the necessary capital through inviting potential buyers to pre-order their products on the crowdfunding platform [6] . The buyers back the crowdfunding products through committing a certain money. In return the entrepreneurs offer products to the buyers [7] . And the platform charges each entrepreneur a commission fee for a successful crowdfunding project. The crowdfunding success indicates that the total funds raised reach or exceed the pre-specified funding goal within a given time duration. In short, if a crowdfunding project is successfully funded, the entrepreneur can gain the raised funds, buyers can receive the promised reward (product) and the platform can obtain the commission from the entrepreneur.
From the above, in a reward-based crowdfunding the revenue of the entrepreneur comes from the successful crowdfunding project's raised funds. And the revenue of the platform is the commission by charging the entrepreneur after the crowdfunding is successful. That is, the revenues of the entrepreneur and the platform depend on the crowdfunding success [2] . Therefore, both the entrepreneur and the platform have motivation to allocate sales efforts to boost the crowdfunding success [8] , [9] . In real-life, the entrepreneur usually allocates sales efforts in the webpage of its crowdfunding project to disseminate the product-related information, such as product progress update, videos for product description, comfortable textual information of products and forums for interactions between the entrepreneur and the buyers [10] . This type of sales efforts can enhance the buyer perception of product value. The higher perception of product value can increase buyer demand, and thus to boost the crowdfunding success. On the other hand, the sales efforts implemented by the platform can be recommendations in various social media platforms such as Twitter or Facebook, and search engine advertising [11] . This type of sales efforts can expand the awareness of both the crowdfunding platform and the crowdfunding projects. Further, the increased awareness will attract more potential buyers and improve the success probability of crowdfunding projects. Hereby, we can abstract two research questions. First, the effects of the two sales efforts on buyer demand and crowdfunding success are different. Due to the different effects, the entrepreneur and the platform may gain different revenues from the two sales efforts. Which types of the sales efforts are best for the entrepreneur and the platform, respectively, is a research question worth investigating. Second, sales efforts are not free in practice, effective sales efforts tend to require financial support [12] , [13] . In general, the entrepreneur and the platform may conduct multiple sales efforts simultaneously. Due to the different characteristics of different sales efforts, the demand of attracted buyer would be different even if the same capital is allocated to each sales effort. In other words, less capital might be allocated to the sales effort when it has high effect in improving crowdfunding success, while relatively more capital might be invested in the sales efforts of low effect. Therefore, it is valuable to rationally allocate the limited capital among sales efforts to increase the success probability of crowdfunding project.
Some scholars have paid close attention to the crowdfunding success in recent years. Roughly, the existing studies in this field can be divided into four categories including internal factors of the crowdfunding projects, external factors promoting the crowdfunding success, the characteristics associated with the initiators and the buyers and different categories of influential factors. Specifically, internal factors of the crowdfunding success include numerical features such as product price, project goals and project durations, and nonnumerical features such as the videos and textual information associated with crowdfunding projects. We refer interested readers to the studies by Hu et al. [2] ; Yuan et al. [4] ; Belleflamme et al. [6] ; Miglo and Miglo [14] ; Ordanini et al. [15] ; Cordova et al. [16] ; de Larrea et al. [17] ; Anglin et al. [18] ; Anglin et al. [19] ; Davis et al. [20] ; Zhou et al. [21] ; and Parhankangas and Renko [22] . For the external factors, the related studies primarily focus on interaction between initiators and buyers and connection with social media, for example, see Skirnevskiy et al. [23] ; Wang et al. [24] ; Hui et al. [25] , [26] ; and Wessel et al. [27] . The characterises of crowdfunding project initiators and buyers that are of primary concern in the existing studies include entrepreneur's backing-history, team experience and altruism of the buyers, etc. We refer the interested readers to the studies by Kim et al. [28] ; Allison et al. [29] ; and Giudici et al. [30] . With regard to the last category of research, they analyze different types of influential factors, such as internal factors and external factors, simultaneously, for example, see Bi et al. [8] ; Qiu [11] ; Wheat et al. [31] ; Gera and Kaur [32] ; Mollick [33] ; and Kaartemo [34] .
Through analyzing the literature, most related studies focus on which strategies or what factors can promote the crowdfunding success. And most of the existing studies examine the basic crowdfunding project properties, such as project goals, project durations and project category [4] . Moreover, only a few studies classify and compare different strategies or factors which can promote crowdfunding success. This paper is different from the existing literature in that it focuses on who should promote the crowdfunding success through comparing the effects of the sales efforts allocated by the entrepreneur and the crowdfunding platform. Therefore, the essential contribution of this study is to discuss who should promote the crowdfunding success. Specifically, we ask the following questions: Who should provide sales efforts to promote the crowdfunding success? When and how do the entrepreneur and platform offer the sales efforts? How do the allocated sales efforts impact the revenues of the entrepreneur and the platform, respectively? To address the above questions, in this paper, we formulate an analytical model in which an entrepreneur launches a crowdfunding project to presell its product on an online crowdfunding platform.
The contributions of this study are summarized as follows: (i) We construct different sales effort scenarios and develop the corresponding mathematical models to quantify the effects of the offered sales efforts on buyer demands, respectively.
(ii) We consider multiple sales efforts of improving the crowdfunding success and build quantitative expressions of the dependency relationship between the sales efforts. Bi et al. [8] and Qiu [11] examine and compare different sales efforts that can promote the crowdfunding success from the empirical perspective. In their papers, they both assume that there is no correlation between the sales efforts. However, sales efforts can be interdependent in practice [35] . To fill this gap, we quantify the dependency between the sales efforts in this paper.
(iii) We formulate analytical models under different sales effort scenarios for the optimization of sales efforts used to boost the crowdfunding success, with the objective of revenue maximization. Through solving the models, we determine the optimal strategies and revenues under each scenario. From the strategies, we show that the sales efforts can indeed facilitate the crowdfunding success and increase the revenues of both the entrepreneur and the platform. However, the sales efforts play a limited role in improving the crowdfunding success. Hence, it is valuable to discreetly allocate capital to the sales efforts.
(iv) We compare the solutions obtained from the models under different sales effort scenarios. The comparison results demonstrate that, with adequate capital of the platform allocated to the sales efforts, both the entrepreneur and the platform prefer the scenario of sales efforts offered by the entrepreneur and the platform. However, when the budget is relatively tight, the scenario of the sales efforts offered only by the entrepreneur may be better.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the research problem and constructs the models under different sales effort scenarios. Section III gives the optimal solutions under each scenario and discusses the basic insights. Then we compare the solutions under different scenarios in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section V.
II. MODELS A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND NOTATIONS
We consider an entrepreneur who launches a project to presell the innovative product on a crowdfunding platform. The entrepreneur specifies the amount of capital it needs to raise, i.e. the funding goal, during a determined time. Within the period of time, buyers can opt to back the project through committing the required money (product price) according to their evaluation of the product value. At the end of that timeline, if the raised funds cover the pre-specified funding goal, the crowdfunding project is successfully funded. Then, the entrepreneur can obtain the raised funds, and the platform can charge a commission fee from the entrepreneur. To improve the success probability of the crowdfunding project and increase the revenues, both the entrepreneur and the platform invest capital in sales efforts to attract more buyers to back the project. Moreover, the entrepreneur can determine its product price to control the buyer demand. The optimal strategies and revenues of sales efforts offered by the entrepreneur or/ and the platform are compared and analyzed to determine the optimal decisions.
In Table 1 , we give the key notations that will be used throughout the paper.
B. BUYER DEMAND ANALYSIS
Buyers pay the project creator the requested money to preorder the crowdfunding product. The requested money indicates the product price p charged by the project creator. Proverbially, a higher product price can reduce the buyer perception of the product value, and thus to reduce buyer demand. Therefore, the buyer demand can be modeled as the market size net the product price, according to the revenue management theory [36] . In crowdfunding markets, the buyer demand can be affected by the network externalities besides the market size and product price. Specifically, crowdfunding platforms constitute two-side markets [37] . A remarkable feature in two-side markets is that there exists network externality [38] . This means that each side of the crowdfunding market can benefit from the participation of the respective other group [39] . Thus, from the perspective of the buyers of the crowdfunding project, the more the expected buyers are, the higher utility each buyer can derive from supporting a crowdfunding project can be. In other words, due to the presence of network externalities, if buyers anticipate that more buyers will support the crowdfunding project, then they may have a higher willingness to pay [40] . And a higher value of the externality indicates a higher willingness to pay [41] . Therefore, we model the demand function as follows.
where nq e reflects the effect of network externalities on the willingness to pay.
C. THE REVENUE OF THE PROJECT CREATOR
Followed by previous related studies, we assume that there exists q e = q under buyers' rational expectation. Therefore, the demand function can be transformed into the VOLUME 7, 2019 following equation.
Revenues of the project creator equal to the total financing amount from the crowdfunding minus the commission fee charged by the platform and the fixed costs of the product. We measure the fixed costs through the funding goal based on the existing related studies. Thus, we give the revenue function of the project creator below.
Revenue of the crowdfunding platform comes from the commission fee. Thus, we develop the revenue function of the platform as follows.
Most crowdfunding platforms adopt the rule of ''all or nothing''. That is, the project creator and the platform can gain the revenues only when the crowdfunding is successful. Therefore, the total financing amount of the project creator should exceed the pre-specified funding goal, i.e., [a − (1 − n)q] q ≥ K should be satisfied.
E. MODEL FORMULATION
For the project creator and the platform, the crowdfunding success is the prerequisite to gain revenues. To improve the success probability of the crowdfunding project, both the project creator and platform may provide efforts to attract more buyers to back the project. As described in the Introduction section, in real-life, the efforts provided by the project creator usually include product progress update, videos for product description, comfortable textual information about products and forums for interactions between the project creator and buyers. The role of these efforts is to increase the buyer evaluation of product value of the crowdfunding project. Further, the increased value perception can improve the expected buyer demand. With respect to the platform' efforts such as the recommendations in social media platforms and search engine advertising, they can expand the awareness of the platform and the project that can increase the potential buyers of the project. Different from the efforts provided by the project creator, these potential buyers who attracted by the increased awareness will not necessarily purchase the product of the crowdfunding project. They may back other projects initiated in the platform. There may exist different scenarios of sales efforts provided by the project creator or/ and the platform. To compare and analyze the different effects of the provided efforts, we formulate different models respectively. In the models, we use linear functions to measure the effects of the sales efforts. The constructed models are given in Table 2 .
As the above analysis, the offered efforts can increase buyer demand. In the actual process of providing sales efforts, the effectiveness of the offered efforts is uncertain. We use random variables satisfying probability distributions to measure the uncertainty of the effectiveness in this paper. Specifically, we assume that the effectiveness of the offered efforts satisfies normal distributions, i.e.,
m and µ 2 b indicate the mean of the effectiveness of the efforts provided by project creator and platform, respectively. And σ 1 m and σ 2 b are respectively the corresponding standard deviations. Moreover, both the project creator and the platform may provide multiple efforts simultaneously. There may exist dependency between a pair of sales efforts. The dependency might be substitute or complementary relationships in practice [35] . The substitute/ complementary relationship means that there is a negative/ positive correlation between the offered sales efforts. A positive correlation indicates that the effects of one sales effort can be boosted by other sales efforts, while a negative correlation represents a counteract effect between the sales efforts [35] . Therefore, we consider and measure the interdependence in this paper. ρ m,m and ρ b,b represent respectively the degree of the interdependence between the offered efforts. Thus, we can obtain
It is worth noting that without loss of generality, M = 2 and B = 2 in this paper. In addition, for the convenience of the model solutions, we assume that
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and r = r C =r P . Therefore, it is not hard to obtain x = x 1 = x 2 , z = z 1 = z 2 .
III. THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS
Three models for different sales effort scenarios are constructed in Table 2 , to investigate how the project creator and the platform offer sales efforts to boost the success of the crowdfunding project. In the developed models, the effectiveness of the offered efforts is represented by random variables. Due to the uncertainty of the effectiveness, the constructed models are stochastic models. For the model of the platform's efforts, we determine the theoretical solutions through transforming it into the corresponding deterministic equivalent equations [42] . The deterministic equivalent equations are presented in the Appendix. With regard to the other two models, we use the simulation method to solve them due to the relative complexity. We employ the software MATLAB R16b to carry out the simulation experiments. To make the simulation results more general, we set the number of simulation to 50000. And the used currency-denominated unit in the simulation results is CNY in this paper. In the following, we give the optimal solutions under each model respectively.
A. THE OPTIMAL DECISIONS UNDER EACH MODEL

Proposition 1: The crowdfunding platform is willing to offer efforts to improve the crowdfunding success, when K
. Proposition 1 shows that when the funding goal specified by the project creator is relatively small, the crowdfunding platform has a stronger motivation to offer sales efforts to boost the crowdfunding success. This is supported by empirical evidence in crowdfunding markets, due to a crowdfunding project with smaller funding goal is more likely to be successful.
Proposition 2: The optimal solutions for the model of the sales efforts offered by the crowdfunding platform are:
;
In Proposition 2, we determine the optimal solutions under the scenario that the platform manager provides sales efforts to improve the success of the crowdfunding project. For the scenario of sales efforts offered by the project creator and that of efforts offered by both the project creator and the platform, we use the simulation method to solve the optimal solutions. The simulation results are given in Fig. 1-Fig. 4 . In these figures, the used parameter values are listed below. And in these figures, the allocated budgets to sales efforts by the project creator and the platform are represented as z and x, respectively. a = 1000, q e = 500, n = 0.9, γ = 0.05, µ 1 = µ 2 = 50,
From Fig. 1 and Fig. 3 , it can be concluded that the expected revenues can increase with the offered sales efforts. However, the revenues would decrease with relatively large budget invested in the sales efforts. This implies that there exists an optimal amount of capital investment in sales efforts, and the budget allocation of sales efforts only play a limited role in boosting the project success. Therefore, the project creator and the platform should discreetly allocate budget to sales efforts. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 3 , compared with the sales efforts offered by the platform, the effects of it offered by the project creator are more dramatic, and the effects on revenues change faster. Thus the project creator should invest more prudently in sales efforts, compared to the crowdfunding platform.
In addition, Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 represent the effects of the invested sales efforts on the product price of the crowdfunding project. It can be seen that the project creator can be forced to lower the product price due to its budget allocation of the sales efforts; while the platform's sales efforts will stimulate the project creator to raise the product price. This may be due to the different effects of the sales efforts conducted by the project creator and the platform. Specifically, the sales efforts offered by the project creator improve the buyer perception of product value that would make buyers predict more buyers to back the product. More buyer demands imply that the crowdfunding project has a higher success probability. Thus, the buyer willingness to pay would reduce. Further, this results in lower product prices. However, the sales efforts offered by the platform can increase the market size for the product. This gives the project creator a strong incentive to raise the product price for raising more funds.
B. PARAMETRIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
It is not hard to see that the optimal solutions of each model are related to many parameters. In this section, we conduct some sensitivity analysis to understand the influences some parameters have on the project creator's and platform's decisions and revenues.
1) THE RESULTS FOR THE MODEL OF THE SALES EFFORTS OFFERED BY THE PLATFORM
The results of the sensitivity analysis for the model of sales efforts offered by the platform are listed in Table 3 . In Table 3 , w * represents the investment willingness of the crowdfunding platform in sales efforts, as shown in Proposition 1. It can be seen from Table 3 that with an increase in the network externality (a higher value of n), the revenues of the project creator and the platform increase. Thus both the project creator and the platform can benefit from high network externality. Hence, with high network externality, the platform is more willing to provide sales efforts to boost the success of the crowdfunding project. This is due to that the high network externality will improve the buyer willingness to pay [37] . And in the case of high network externality, less budget is needed for sales efforts to attract more buyers to back the crowdfunding project.
Moreover, if more potential buyers (a high value of µ 1 ) can be attracted by the allocated unit budget of sales efforts, then revenues of both the project creator and the platform increase. Therefore, the platform is motivated by the higher revenues to invest more capital in sales efforts. In reallife, most entrepreneurs generally recognize that investing in effective sales efforts can help them save the capital. This result shows that although entrepreneurs can benefit from effective sales efforts, they will be incentivized to allocate more budget to sales efforts for high revenues. This may lead to a financial crisis. Thus, investing in effective sales efforts may not guarantee high revenues, especially when the total budget of the entrepreneur is not sufficient.
In addition, with a positive correlation between the offered sales efforts, revenues of the project creator and the platform decrease as the degree of the correlation increases. Therefore, the investment willingness of the platform in sales efforts decreases. In contrast, when there is a negative interdependency between the sales efforts, both the project creator and the platform can benefit from the high degree of the correlation. Under such case, the platform should offer more sales efforts to boost crowdfunding success.
2) THE RESULTS FOR THE MODEL OF THE SALES EFFORTS OFFERED BY THE PROJECT CREATOR
With regard to the model of sales efforts offered by the project creator, the simulation results of sensitivity analysis are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , all the used parameter values are the same as those given in A of Section III. From Fig. 5 , when there is a negative correlation between the sales efforts offered by the project creator, with increase of the degree of the correlation, the project creator needs to invest more capitals in sales efforts for the same revenues. However, if there is a positive correlation between the sales efforts, small budget allocated to the sales efforts can help the project creator and the platform gain high revenues. Therefore, with relatively tight capital, the project creator should offer the sales efforts of positive correlation. Moreover, when there is a positive correlation between the sales efforts, the revenues of the project creator and the platform change rapidly with the allocated budget to sales efforts, as shown in Fig. 5 . Thus due to the greater effects of the positive correlation, the project creator should be more cautious in the budget allocation for sales efforts.
In addition, different from the scenario of sales efforts offered by the platform, the effects of the interdependency between sales efforts offered by the project creator on the optimal revenues are not dramatic according to Fig. 5 . Hence, although the degree of interdependency may be difficult to 48158 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 9. The impact of network externality on revenues of the project creator, when both the project creator and the platform offer sales efforts. be obtained in practice and need careful evaluation, the deviations of the evaluation values about the correlation have little effects on the optimal revenues, when the project creator offers sales efforts.
From Fig. 6 , with high network externality, higher revenues can be obtained by the project creator and the platform. Therefore, both the project creator and the platform can benefit from the high network externality. Thus under such a case, the project creator has higher motivation to invest more budget in sales efforts. Besides, with a continuous increase in the network externality, greater effects of it on the revenues and budget investment will be caused.
3) THE RESULTS FOR THE MODEL OF THE SALES EFFORTS OFFERED BY THE PROJECT CREATOR AND THE PLATFORM
Under the scenario of sales efforts offered by the project creator and the platform, we give the simulation results of the parameter sensitivity analysis in Fig. 7-Fig. 10 . In the four figures, ρ 1 and ρ 2 indicate respectively the dependencies between the sales efforts offered by the platform and the project creator. And all the used parameter values in the figures are the same as those presented in A of Section III.
It can be seen from Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 that compared to the strategies and revenues of the platform, the interdependency between sales efforts has greater effects on those of VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 11. The impacts of network externality on revenues of the project creator under the constructed three models.
FIGURE 12.
The impacts of network externality on revenues of the platform under the constructed three models.
the project creator. Thus, the project creator should focus more on the interdependency. Moreover, since the negative correlation implies the counteract effects between the sales efforts, the project creator should carefully balance the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of the sales efforts with negative correlation, as shown in Fig. 7(4) and Fig. 7(7) . It reveals that sales efforts with negative correlation may hurt the project creator and the platform. Due to the opposite effect of a positive correlation, both the project creator and the platform can benefit from the sales efforts with positive correlation, such as Fig. 7(2) and Fig. 8(2) . Therefore, it is preferable to provide sales efforts with positive correlation, especially when the project creator has tight total budget.
Similar to the scenario of sales efforts offered by the project creator, when the project creator and the platform offer sales efforts simultaneously, higher revenues can be obtained if the network externality is high. Although both the project creator and the platform can benefit from high network externality, they should prudently allocate the budget to sales efforts due to the higher effects of the high network externality, as shown in Fig. 9(d) and Fig. 10(d) . In addition, from Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , the network externality has greater impacts on the strategies and revenues of the project creator, compared with the impacts on the platform. Thus, the project creator needs to pay more attention to the network externality.
IV. MODEL COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
The optimal solutions of each model have been determined and basic sights have been obtained in Section III. In order to explore who should allocate sales efforts for improving crowdfunding success, we compare and analyze the optimal strategies and revenues of the formulated three models, respectively. The simulation results of the comparisons are given as follows. And similarly all the used parameter values are the same as those listed in Section III. We demonstrate the comparison results from the project creator's perspective and the platform's perspective, respectively. Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show the comparison results of different models under different network externality. When the network externality is low, the project creator prefers the scenario of investing capital in sales efforts separately if the total budget of the platform is relatively tight, as shown in Fig. 11 . If the platform has relatively sufficient budget, while the platform also offers sales efforts, the project creator can raise more funds. However, with high network externality, the project creator can always benefit more from the sales efforts offered by both the creator and the platform. In practice, the project creators generally believe that a large market size can ensure high revenues. From our results, we can conclude that the larger market size expanded by sales efforts may not imply high revenues. And it is better to improve the buyer evaluation of product value.
For the platform, with low network externality, it is better that the platform invests in sales efforts separately when its total budget is relatively tight. With the increase in the network externality, the platform should not invest in sales efforts. The sales efforts invested by the project creator can help the platform improve revenues, according to Fig. 12 . However, if the platform has sufficient total budget, the platform can obtain more revenues when it and the project creator provide sales efforts simultaneously. Fig. 13(a), Fig. 13(b) , Fig. 14(a) and Fig. 14(b) , with high positive correlation between the sales efforts, if the platform has tight budget, the project creator can gain higher revenues VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 21. The impacts of the mean of sales efforts' effectiveness on revenues of the project creator under different models. when it offers sales efforts but the platform does not offer efforts. Under such a case, with an increase in the total budget, higher funds can be raised by the project creator when both the creator and the platform invest in sales efforts. However, if there is low degree of the interdependency between sales efforts, the project creator always prefers to provide sales efforts separately, as shown in Fig. 13(c), Fig. 13(d) , Fig. 14(c) and Fig. 14(d) .
According to Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 , the effects of the positive correlation between sales efforts on revenues of the platform are similar to that on the project creator. In the interests of brevity, it is not repeated here.
With respect to the negative correlation between the offered sales efforts, the degree of the negative correlation has little effects on the comparison between different models from the perspective of the project creator, as shown in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 . Specifically, when there is a negative correlation between the offered sales efforts, the project creator always prefers to offer sales efforts separately if the platform has a relatively tight total budget. However, if total budget of the platform is sufficient, the project creator can raise more funds when the platform also offers sales efforts.
According to Fig. 19 and Fig. 20 , the effects of the negative correlation between sales efforts on revenues of the platform are similar to that on the project creator. In the interests of brevity, it is not repeated here.
From Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 , with low effectiveness of the invested sales efforts, both the project creator and the platform can gain greater revenues when they invest in sales efforts simultaneously. With increase of the effectiveness, 48164 VOLUME 7, 2019
if the platform has tight total budget, then it is better that the project creator invests in sales efforts separately. While when the total budget of the platform is sufficient, higher revenues can be obtained if both the platform and the project creator offer sales efforts.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we determine the sales effort strategies in a crowdfunding environment. To boost the crowdfunding success and gain more revenues, both the project creator and the platform manager may invest in sales efforts. Different sales effort scenarios are firstly constructed; next the corresponding mathematical models are formulated. And then we obtain the optimal solutions for each scenario from the developed models, respectively. Finally, we compare the optimal strategies and revenues under different scenarios. The comparison results show that if the platform has sufficient capitals for providing sales efforts, it is preferable that both the project creator and the platform invest in sales efforts to improve the project success. With relatively tight total budget of the platform, the project creator should invest in sales efforts, while the platform offers sales efforts only when the effectiveness of the sales efforts is low or the network externality is low. In addition, if both the project creator and the platform have tight budgets, sales efforts will be provided only when the pre-specified funding goal is low. Moreover, several valuable findings are drawn. First, relatively small funding goal will stimulate the sales effort investment because of the greater likelihood of the crowdfunding success. Second, the sales effort investment is an effective strategy to boost the crowdfunding success. However, the role of the sales efforts is limited, so it is imperative to give a proper budget allocation for sales efforts. Third, both the project creator and the platform can benefit from the high network externality. However, due to the greater effects of the high network externality, it is needed to make a more cautious budget allocation for sales efforts. Fourth, both the platform and the project creator prefer the sales efforts with positive interdependency. Fifth, sales efforts with high effectiveness might not bring high revenues, since more sales efforts will be incentivized by this to offer. And more investment implies more cost and it may lead to a financial crisis. Sixth, more potential buyers attracted by the platform's sales efforts will encourage the project creator to raise the product price. However, the project creator will be forced by its own sales efforts to reduce the product price.
The main managerial implications are summarized as follows. First, during the financing process of crowdfunding projects, the project creators should offer more sales efforts to boost the project success compared to the platform. Second, it is universally recognized that the key to the successful launch of new products is to expand the market size. In contrast, for new products in the crowdfunding context, a larger market size expanded by the offered sales efforts may not imply high revenues. And compared to the market size expansion, it might be profitable to provide efforts to enhance the buyer evaluation of the product value. This can encourage the entrepreneurs of new products to improve the description of product information.
APPENDIX
A. THE DETERMINISTIC EQUIVALENT EQUATIONS FOR THE MODEL OF THE PLATFORM'S SALES EFFORTS
With regard to the model of sales efforts offered by the crowdfunding platform, we construct the corresponding deterministic equivalent equations below. where q = (a − p)/(1 − n).
E(R
B. SECOND-ORDER CONDITIONS
Hessian matrices and the second-order condition for the model of sales efforts offered by the platform are given as follows. From this, we can easily show that under this scenario, the revenue functions of the project creator and the platform are strictly concave functions with respect to their respective decisions variables. Therefore, there exist unique optimal solutions (A3)-(A4), as shown at the top of the this page.
